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Abstract 
Motivated by a perceived lacuna in theoretical discussions on income inequality, this paper 
explores an approach based on the place in that inequality of economic rents. Although 
widely recognized as a subject to be considered in relation to inequality, rents are still failing 
to receive a conceptually and theoretically unified treatment. In fact, although accepted as an 
element in the distribution branch of economics, economic rents have been subject to a 
somewhat incomplete treatment, especially when it comes to understanding the origin in 
wealth ownership. This blind spot invites cross-disciplinary collaboration as a means of 
elucidation. So, in this paper, I review and systematize scattered conceptual and theoretical 
contributions on the subject drawn from the literatures of both economics and sociology. 
Briefly, while economics delineates the market phenomenon giving rise to rents, sociology 
sheds light on the influence of background social structure on both the supply and demand 
blades of the ‘market scissor’. This is to some extent reminiscent of Marx’s class struggle 
analysis; but Marx’s original view is amplified by the sociological perspectives I review here, 
as the latter identify and conceptualize rents earned by labour in addition to those earned by 
capital. Two ideas that sprang from my reading of the sociological perspectives should be 
placed at the very core of a rents-based approach to inequalities. The first is that the normal 
functioning of markets does not make economic rents disappear; the second is that all 
earnings are relative, so that rents, including negative rents, are a vital part of everyone’s 
remuneration in contemporary capitalist economies. An outline of a rents-based theory of 
inequality is proposed and normative and policy consequences of undertaking this move are 
hinted at. 
Keywords: inequality; economic rents; social structure; capital; social surplus 
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1. Introduction 
This paper is motivated by the perception that, despite a rapid advance in the measurement 
of economic inequality, understanding of the phenomenon is still elusive. It is not that many 
of the processes, mechanisms and factors involved have not been singled out and computed, 
for they have.1 But a common language to bring coherence to what we know –moreover, a 
language that can play an essential part in establishing an overarching understanding – 
seems still to be missing. 
In fact, when considering the measurement of economic inequality, one immediately 
encounters a puzzle. For it is often the case that two different computations of economic 
inequality are opposed one to the other, each computation relating to different assumptions 
about the functioning of market economies and inequalities therein. These are the 
measurement of inequality between individuals (interpersonal inequality) and that of 
inequality between capital and labour (functional inequality). Functional inequality, by 
contrasting labour and capital income shares, conveys information that fits into the political 
economy tradition, which depicts economic relations in terms of class relations. Yet, recent 
data on interpersonal inequality has seemingly blurred the divide between the worlds of 
labour and capital, as those in receipt of wages are among the top income earners – and this 
is increasingly the case.2 In a symmetrical development, the computation of interpersonal 
inequality, a concept the origins of which can be traced to individualistic approaches to market 
economies, has been tracking the existence of a binary distribution. It has uncovered two 
separate worlds in terms of magnitude, trends, and political economies: that of the rich and 
that of ‘the rest’.3  
This confrontation of measurements suggests that the language used to compute economic 
inequality – whether in terms of income shares of capital and labour or individual incomes – 
may be leading us astray instead of helping us to pin down the phenomenon to be 
theoretically unravelled.4 The implicit idea of a ‘quantiles war’ seems unappealing. How then 
to make sense of the economic inequality of our time?  
Beyond individual incomes and capital-versus-labour income shares, economic rents, as still 
another name for the inequalisandum, loom as a world yet to be intellectually conquered. 
Economic rents are usually referred to in order to describe unusual, undeserved or 
‘unearned’, types of income – typically excessive or beyond ‘fair’ remuneration, implied to be 
remuneration beyond that which corresponds to actual contribution. However, rents are 
 
1 For overviews, refer to Grusky and Hill 2018, Palma 2019, and Atkinson 2015, among many others. 
2 Piketty 2014; Milanovic 2017, 2019. 
3 Piketty 2014; Atkinson 2015; and Palma 2019, in which the two worlds are the top 10% and the bottom 40% 
of the income distribution. For Palma, it is between these two groups that the distributive struggle is taking place 
nowadays. I thank Robert Wade for sending me the reference to this important paper. 
4 Trying to solve this difficulty by replacing those categories of inequality by deciles, as in Palma 2019, only 
shows the relevance of the present discussion, for in that case, the name of a quantity (decile), i.e. the 
‘representation’, is replacing what it is meant to measure, the ‘represented’ (a socially meaningful unit). Also, 
this unreliability is reflected in the shifting denominations given to the two extremes of income receivers often 
present in the same text: e.g. capitalists or capital owners and workers, elites and workers, top earners and 
bottom earners, and so on. 
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increasingly seen as an important element in contemporary economies, and in the 
inequalities in these economies. Moreover, rents are generally perceived as crisscrossing the 
usual capital-labour frontier. This notwithstanding, the relationship between rents and the 
incomes accruing to owners of capital and to labour has never been satisfactorily clarified, 
either at a conceptual or a theoretical level. As an illustration, consider the current analytical 
undecidedness regarding where to establish the frontier between profits and rents (received 
by capital owners), or between salaries and rents (received by top wage earners). In sum, 
what if the intuitive association of rents with high (possibly exploitative) incomes does capture 
a central aspect of social reality? One hypothesis to explore is the presumption that rents are 
at the core of current income distribution; that they signify more than the excessive returns 
they have been taken to represent; that they actually lie below the surface of many forms of 
income; that, in other words, rents as a category might provide a language – missing so far 
– in which we can discuss income inequality on a more reliable footing.  
This paper explores this possibility in a piecemeal fashion by searching for, and 
systematizing, scattered conceptual and theoretical contributions. My first line of enquiry was: 
what have those who have given rents serious consideration come up with? How do they 
define rents? How relevant do they think rents are to understanding contemporary 
inequalities? The intention was not so much to come up with a history of ideas, but rather to 
survey and systematize definitions of rents, and arguments about the relationship between 
rents and inequality. Thus, a precise chronology of the arguments was not important and was 
not established.  
My initial focus was on the literature of economics. However, as I was engaging with this, it 
became clear that an approach to rents based purely on economics would not do, and that a 
sociological perspective was also needed – in fact, there is an important sociological tradition 
that gives economic rents pride of place. Briefly, contributions from economics single out the 
market power of economic agents as the ultimate source of rents accruing to them – market 
power being conceived either as a transient (for modern neoclassical economics, see Alchian 
more ahead) or a more constitutive (for classical and heterodox economics) trait of market 
economies. Sociological approaches, by contrast, go one step back, beyond markets, or 
before markets, towards class or class-fraction positions in the social structure which are 
defined in terms of exclusive ownership of tangible and non-tangible capitals. In other words, 
while sociology singles out social closures - i.e. groups’ exclusive ownership of valuable 
resources -, economics singles out monopoly - i.e. the market power of economic actors - as 
the root causes of rents. Granted, market power is a form of social closure; but social closures 
go beyond markets.  
By bringing in social closures (thus, class differentiation), a sociological approach provides a 
broader take on rents than does an economic one. This is because, while stressing exclusive 
ownership of valuable resources, such an approach also sheds light on rents as components 
of the remuneration of both capitalists and workers. It does so by supposing that the 
possession of valuable resources or ‘capitals’ (in Bourdieu’s rather broad sense of capital) is 
orthogonal to the usual capital-labour distinction: both capital owners and wage earners may 
have capital in this broad sense. More radically, as we shall see, the ultimate implication of 
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the argument is that rents are pervasive, that they invade the spheres of both ‘normal’ profit 
and ‘normal’ wages. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Starting with the economics literature, I report, in 
Section 2, the evolution of definitions of rents in mainstream economics, as the field 
progressively distanced itself from previous, nineteenth century, ‘sociological’ explanations, 
i.e. those stressing non-economic factors. My basic source for this part is the most referenced 
economics dictionary in the English language, the Dictionary of Political Economy (later to be 
called the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics) originally edited by Palgrave (all editions 
from 1894 up to 2018).  After that, in Section 3, I engage with classical and heterodox 
economics perspectives for which rents are central, both as a category in its own right and 
as potential explanation for economic inequalities. In Section 4, a contemporary sociological 
perspective is presented. Though it has some internal differentiation, this perspective is 
roughly unified around the agenda of a post-liberal, not strictly speaking individualistic, 
contribution to thinking about inequalities. Here, rents also have a central place in the 
explanation of inequalities.5 Among the more critical views of rents, in both economics and 
sociology, the legacy of Marx is widely cited. Marx’s imprint is visible in the acknowledgement 
of rents’ importance and the potentially troubling consequences of this. It is less visible when 
it comes to embracing his exploitation theory. Section 5 closes the paper by re-emphasising 
its main points and proposing the outline of a rents-based approach to economic inequality.  
 
2. Textbook definitions 
Modern mainstream economics approaches economic rents as a phenomenon associated 
with scarcity of valuable resources. Despite also representing rents as resulting from market 
phenomena (instances of short supply of valued resources), late nineteenth century 
definitions, as they came to be set out in leading economics reference works such as 
Palgrave’s Dictionary, depicted a more complex picture by alluding to the effect of non-
economic factors on market forces. And it was these earlier contributions to the discussion 
that suggested core elements of the research agenda followed in this paper.  In this section, 
I present and discuss nineteenth century Palgrave entries on ‘the basis of rents’ and ‘rents of 
ability’ and a later formulation that survived up until the most recent 2018 edition of the 
Dictionary.  
 
5 Incidentally, I found within sociological perspectives a similar divide that I had found in economics. For some 
authors or theoretical subsets, inequalities based on rents should be considered unfair so long as they express 
(artificially obtained) monopoly powers of groups of people, and not exclusively different economic contributions. 
For other authors or theoretical subsets, the ability to extract rents from differential powers is seen as the normal 
dynamic in a capitalist economy, and it is the origin of these differential powers which then needs to be 
unearthed. I thank Peter Evans for suggesting that I should make explicit this distinction. 
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The 1899 edition of the Palgrave’s Dictionary of Political Economy, the first to include the 
letter ‘r’,  brought two entries for economic rents, one entitled ‘rent, the basis of’, by Alfred 
William Flux,6 and the other entitled ‘rents of ability’, by Caroline Foley.7  
Flux’s entry starts with David Ricardo’s classic definition of rents of land. For Ricardo, ‘[r]ent 
is that portion of the produce of the earth which is paid to the landlord for the use of the 
original and indestructible powers of the soil.’ (282) Similarly, for Alfred Marshall, a second 
economist quoted, it is ‘[t]he income derived from the ownership of land and other free gifts 
of nature.’ (282) Flux then proposes to extend this common definition to other cases beyond 
land and the gifts of nature:  
Income derived from the ownership of special facilities of production not accessible to all possesses 
economic characteristics which correspond closely to those of rent of land. (282)  
Flux further states, ‘[t]he underlying basis of rent is the difference of return to equal effort’. 
(283) And the central supposition is one of exclusive ownership of the best resources, which 
are increasingly valued:  
the doctrine... assumes the ownership of productive facilities…, assumes that they are not equally open 
to every producer in fact... The best is limited and is made the subject of ownership. The necessity to 
utilize opportunities less favourable than the best existing brings the fact and degree of their superiority 
to the front and gives it value. (283) 
Flux concludes that the basis of rents for the owners of the best resources is a combination 
of ‘the necessity to utilize opportunities less favourable’ (i.e. increased demand) and the 
exclusive ‘ownership of the best of the productive facilities’ (i.e. fixed supply).  
The entry, however, while acknowledging the importance of the elements thus combined, 
does not provide further insights into the question of ‘necessity’, i.e. factors explaining 
increased demand, nor does it look into how ‘the best’ came to be ‘limited’ and ‘the subject 
of ownership’, i.e. factors leading to a fixed supply. To some extent, this is also the case with 
two other problems, which, again, are hinted at but not followed through. The first is the 
difficulty of separating capital invested in land from ‘the original powers of the soil’, thus, 
separating profits accruing to invested capital from rents accruing to the use of the best 
natural resources. The second problem is social costs, i.e. reductions in social well-being that 
may be associated with the payment of monopoly rents. In this regard, Flux remarks that 
although they are not a cost of production, rents may nonetheless contribute to increasing 
prices if they result from monopolistic behaviour – or, in other words, from artificially 
generated short supply.  
In sum, the entry provides conceptual tools that would later be selectively appropriated by 
the neoclassical economics reading of rents – excess demand, short supply, monopoly rents 
 
6 Alfred William Flux, MA Fellow of St. John’s College, Cambridge, and Professor at Owens College, 
Manchester, was a British economist and statistician who in 1890 became a foundation member of the 
Economic Association. 
7 Caroline Foley was one among the first women to get degrees (a BA in 1886 and an MA in 1889) in Political 
Economy from a British university, University College, London. She also became a foundation member of the 
British Economic Association in 1890. 
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– as, for example, in the definitions by Armen Alchian and Gordon Tullock that we shall 
introduce later. However, the key issues it indicates need to be further clarified if a thorough 
approach is aimed at. These include how to distinguish profits from rents, i.e. consideration 
of the extent to which profits can be considered apart from the reference provided by 
ownership of valuable assets. Also, if wealth ownership (here the ‘productive facilities’) is the 
ultimate basis of rent, there needs to be consideration of the extent to which that ownership 
is legitimate, how it originates and how it perpetuates and transmits itself. These issues will 
be brought into play by the sociological literature we review in Section 4.  
The following entry, ‘rents of ability’, by Caroline Foley, tackles rents of labour. Foley, like 
Flux, seeks to provide a definition similar to that of rents of land; but her subject is ‘human 
bodies and minds’, a domain even more dissimilar to land than Flux’s productive facilities. 
Using wording she attributes to Nassau Senior, Foley initially defines rent of ability as ‘a 
species’ of the same ‘genus of reward’ as that to which rent of land belongs. It is, she adds, 
the ‘residual element of reward which nature or fortune bestows … an exceptional or 
differential profit beyond the given average rate of remuneration.’ (285) Rent of ability arises 
when a natural monopoly ‘of extraordinary qualities of body and mind’ meets with a demand 
temporarily or permanently in excess of supply (285). In other words, rent emerges when rare 
talents are in high demand. 
Foley would, however, subsequently, recognize the presence of a third element, in addition 
to natural monopoly and high demand,  consideration of which would inadvertently distort her 
proposed analogy between natural ability and (good quality) land.8 This element is Conjunctur 
(285) – a German word, used by scholars of the German Historical School to signify a set of 
beneficial circumstances due not to effort but to good fortune.  
Foley does not develop this third element any further, but refers to the definition of Conjunctur 
contributed to the Dictionary by John Bonar9 as a complementary discussion. In that entry, 
included in the first (1894) edition of the Dictionary, Bonar describes Conjunctur as 
comprising ‘inherited wealth, influential parentage, nationality and education’, or, as he 
summarizes it, a ‘good start in life’. This is a condition that gives an advantage to the person 
enjoying it that is analogous to the luck of a speculator who enjoys an ‘opportunity to realize 
a fortune without labor’. And, Bonar adds, in both cases ‘[no] breach of the rules of 
competition’ is involved (387). In the end, a good start in life, even if not in any sense a natural 
ability, might represent an advantage that is not unfair. 
On reflection, however, we see that extraordinary qualities of body and mind, on the one 
hand, and a good start in life, on the other, despite both being fortunate circumstances for 
those who happen to possess them, differ in the extent to which they can be considered 
irremediably random. For the sake of simplicity, let us call them the natural and the social 
 
8 An obvious difference is ownership: natural abilities cannot be separated from those who have them, whilst 
land ownership can, at least in our ‘modern societies’. And, as Flux had remarked, rents relate to the ownership 
of the best resources. 
9 John Bonar (1852 –1941) was a Scottish political economist and historian of economic thought. 
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lotteries. While both are chance events, the latter has to do with social origins and may be 
amenable to compensation in a way that the other one cannot be.10 Bonar mentions that 
‘moderate German socialists’ of his time were advocating policies that would spread a good 
start in life more evenly. He himself stops short of explicitly endorsing such policies, but rather 
suggests that ‘no breach of the rules of competition’ occurs when the social lottery gives 
someone an advantage.  
But there is an obvious ambiguity here. True, the suggestion by Bonar that advantages 
deriving from the social lottery can coexist with the rules of competition might mean an implicit 
normative endorsement of such advantages. But it might, alternatively, offer a warning that 
the ‘no breach of the rules of competition’ clause is too lax a normative criterion by which to 
assess such rents, which, as has been said, accrue to the good-start-in-life guys. This 
ambiguity would later be undermined by one reading of it being embraced by neoclassical 
economists, and the other by heterodox economists and post-liberal sociologists: abiding by 
the rules of competition would be deemed necessary and sufficient normative clearance for 
rents by the former, while it would be deemed neither one nor the other by the latter two 
groups of thinkers. This turns out to be an important point of contention, to which we shall 
come back in the next two Sections. 
Foley’s rents-of-ability entry covers some terrain in differentiating rewards due to investment 
from rewards due to talent. She argues that the good fortune of having a rare talent must be 
separated from the sacrifice needed for developing it (286). A parallel with the profit-rent 
distinction hinted at by Flux comes to mind: in the present case, profits reward investment in 
education (education premiums), while rents accrue to non-replicable talents. Of course, the 
problem of the empirical distinction between profits and rents lingers: where do profits end 
and rents start? But since Foley’s initial definition puts rents on a par with earnings ‘beyond 
the average rate of remuneration’, thus implying that markets manage the pricing of skills and 
talents, she skips the need for more complicated calculations.  
In this connection, a more intriguing point made by Foley is that differential rewards accruing 
to special skills or rare talents cannot disappear, even with further (public?) investment in 
education. So, (I venture) she guesses that the moderate socialists referred to by Bonar, 
those who wanted to mitigate the uneven effects of the social lottery, will not carry the day:  
However classified, rent of ability and of fortunate contingency is a factor which under a system of 
competition militates ever more and more against any tendency to equality in returns, whether these 
are called wages or profits. The greater the investment of capital in the training of natural abilities, the 
more general the opportunities to cultivate the same, the more differential becomes the profit of those 
who in themselves and in the turn of events possess that species of monopoly analogous to that arising 
from the possession of the most remunerative portions of the earth’s surface. (286, my emphases)  
Of course, the unequal outcome referred to in the quotation is not assured. For although 
training will enhance the advantages of the naturally talented, that talents accrue to those 
who have also won the social lottery is not guaranteed. But the paradox of equality 
 
10 Sociologist (and historian) Charles Tilly, whose ideas we shall review later, even challenges assumptions 
about the perfect independence of natural and social capabilities. 
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engendering inequality – be it the procedural equality ingrained in a system of competition or 
the equalization of opportunities via deliberate efforts – offers fertile ground for discussion 
and gives rise to different readings, such as Bourdieu’s, which we shall discuss in Section 4.  
A final point suggested by Foley is that demand may take us by surprise, in the sense of 
making rents appear unexpectedly. She comments that ‘[f]or a pianist to be offered in England 
a thousand guineas in remuneration for one evening’s display – as happened recently – 
would some years ago have been an impossibility’ (286). This rather vague but thought-
provoking point concerning a possible conventional attribution of value to skills or talents is 
again discussed at length by Bourdieu, whose ideas on the demand side of the rents issue 
will also be dealt with in Section 4.  
To summarize, as in Flux’s agenda, the elements of circumstantial demand and fixed supply 
are present in Foley’s entry. Foley too brings in the sociological drivers behind the forces of 
supply and demand – in this case, the social lottery, the capacity of an equalizing system to 
generate rents and inequality, and the conventional character of demand – even if she does 
not address them extensively. As we move on through the Sections of this paper, each one 
of these points will be examined again, as they are central to the alternative readings I review 
here. 
Later editions of what was originally Palgrave’s Dictionary – the change in its title from the 
Dictionary of Political Economy to The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics may be 
significant – witness important changes in the treatment of rents. From 1987 to 2018 (the 
most recent edition) the entry on rents was contributed by Armen Alchian,11 with only minor 
modifications, if any, from one year to the next. Previous references to ownership, a good 
start in life, nature versus good fortune, and profit versus rent, as well as possible normative 
objections to rents, all but disappeared. Alchian’s entry provides a brief and very selective 
history of past definitions of rents, all of which are turned into special cases of what is 
proposed as a more general definition. No mention is made to the previous contributions by 
Foley and Flux to the same Dictionary.  
Alchian bluntly defines economic rent as ‘payment for the use of a service whose supply is 
fixed’ (11522). It emerges from competition for the use of a scarce resource, and serves a 
social purpose by indicating and promoting the highest value use of that resource. True, 
‘monopoly rents’, an additional form of rent, may arise in markets from artificial or contrived 
restrictions to competition. But these may be dissipated by competition to impose restrictions 
among rent-seekers, and competition to be ‘in a position to grant such favours’ among 
politicians (11527). Alchian’s summary of previous contributions cites Marshall’s quasi-rents 
and composite-rents, both of a temporary character (in his view, monopoly rents that tend to 
disappear), and Ricardian rents, which, though not temporary, accrue to different units of 
some resource that are differentiated on account of various desirable associated factors 
(location, fertility), and thus serve an allocative function. It should be noted that while Flux’s 
and Foley’s definitions, respectively, of rent of capital and rent of labor, were modelled on the 
 
11 A noted Armenian-American UCLA professor of economics (1914-2013), former long-term affiliate of the 
Rand Corporation, and former member of the Mont Pelérin Society. 
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Ricardian definition of rent of land (i.e. differential rents accruing to high quality 
resources/talents because lower quality ones were employed in order to satisfy demand), the 
more general definition proposed by Alchian implies that rents accrue to any relatively scarce 
resource (as any economic resource is) as a reward for its marginal product.  
As said, Alchian’s definition obscures the issue of ownership of resources through the use of 
agent-less sentences: resources ‘go’ to different uses, without mention to their exclusive 
owners. In fact, a persisting problem in neoclassical economics is the issue of the initial 
distribution of valuable resources, actually a non-issue, and the related (non-)issue of social 
class, both of which we shall come back to in Section 4. When it comes to social costs, these 
are equated with those effects of monopolies that can be competed away. An example of a 
less sanguine view of monopoly rents is provided in a contribution by Gordon Tullock12 to the 
2018 NPDE, in which he defines rent-seeking as ‘investment of resources in efforts to create 
monopolies’ (11530). In that entry, Tullock argues that even though the deadweight loss – 
i.e. the negative effect of artificial scarcity on social welfare – created by monopolies may 
disappear, the social cost is still significant. It amounts to rent-seeking behavior, which 
directly hampers efficiency. He declares ‘the large-scale lobbying industry’ to be ‘a major 
social cost’: ‘these highly talented people could produce more on some other activity’ (11534). 
And yet, while this more critical view of the notion of efficient markets might lead to the 
endorsement of government regulation aiming at halting ‘wasteful’ rent-seeking activities, the 
entry does not go that far.  
In any case, it is remarkable that, despite rents affecting income distribution and being 
affected by wealth distribution, these relationships are not investigated in either the early or 
the recent mainstream contributions mentioned above. In fact, while social costs such as the 
deadweight losses of monopolies and other wasteful behavior are mentioned, inequality is 
not even named as a possible cost to society. By contrast, theoretical contributions located 
on the periphery of the economics mainstream have taken issue with both inefficiency and 
inequality, suggesting that inequalities fueled by monopoly rents are themselves not 
inconsiderable social costs. Among the leading contributors, economist Joseph Stiglitz (2013) 
and political scientists Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson (2010) identify rents – more 
accurately, rent-seeking – as key components of current economic inequalities. Rent-
seeking, they claim, is an activity that favors the rich and powerful, who focus on getting 
opportunities for collecting rents from governments. They assert that both regulation 
(restrictions on competition, usually favoring those at the top) and deregulation (which gives 
free rein to commodification, usually harming workers at the bottom), the twin outcomes of 
rent-seeking, are key means of rent-extraction underlying contemporary inequalities. This 
perspective is akin to that presented by political sociologist David Grusky, which we shall 
discuss later. Together, they belong in the ‘political turn’ in inequality studies, which focusses 
on how existing economic inequalities play out in the political arena to promote the 
persistence and expansion of privileges. In comparison, as we recognize below, classical 
 
12 A leading American public choice theorist (1922-2014), with a training both in economics and law, Tullock 
was one of the founders of the Public Choice field of research. 
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and heterodox economics saw rents as rooted in the very processes of wealth creation in 
capitalist economies. 
Summing up the definitions and arguments thus far: rents are seen as a market phenomenon 
and their emergence as resulting from either competition for the use of a valuable and scarce 
resource/talent, in which case no fairness problem is involved, or artificially generated short 
supply of the valuable resource. In the modern neoclassical version, even the latter rents are 
not perceived as unfair as they may disappear in the face of competition; but other 
neoclassical and post-neoclassical scholars think otherwise. In fact, both the rent-seeking 
literature and its more inequality-sensitive offspring are particularly concerned about 
monopoly rents. 
 
3. The ‘long shadow of Marx’13- I 
In distinction to their inconspicuous and to some extent unproblematic presence in 
neoclassical economics, rents, now in the general sense of appropriation without contribution, 
stimulated considerable attention and concern in classical economics. Underlying these 
different attitudes are different ways of representing the economic system: as a static 
equilibrium of market forces, in neoclassical economics; and as a dynamic system of 
production, distribution and accumulation of surplus, in classical economics. Each of these 
views contemplates one of two different sets of economic actors: individual owners of 
production factors; and economic classes, i.e. propertied and non-propertied collective 
actors, whose status, typically, was that of landowners, capitalists and workers. And while 
the relationship among individual owners of production factors is in modern neoclassical 
economics framed as taking place within a production function to which each of them 
contributes and is rewarded according to his/her relative scarcity, the relationship between 
economic classes is, in classical economics, framed as conflictual and rents as intensely 
sought after.  
So, in the classical tradition, rents are integral to the distributive dispute between economic 
classes; and the distributive dispute, in turn, is at the core of the surplus-producing economic 
system. David Ricardo, for example, imagined a scenario where ‘rentier’ landowners (the 
possessors of the most desired and increasingly limited natural resources) would, in time and 
with economic development, absorb the surplus generated by the capitalist-championed 
production system and eventually drive the system to a steady state. An intra-dominant-class 
distributive conflict around the surplus, if unchecked, may lead the economic system to stall. 
In a contrasting way, though still within the broad parameters of the classical tradition, Karl 
Marx saw the distributive dispute over the surplus within the dominant classes as less 
systemically detrimental than another more fundamental one – that between the dominant 
and dominated classes.  
 
13 I took this expression from Jackson and Grusky (2018), though they employ it in a different context. 
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Thus, Marx theorized that capitalists in the commercial (commercial capital) and financial 
(interest-bearing capital) spheres, though living-off the surplus generated in the productive 
sphere (primary, secondary and tertiary sectors), could still assist the reproduction of the 
economic system through their services to the latter. Even owners of scarce resources (e.g. 
landowners, among others), rewarded with surplus profits (rents) owed to them exclusively 
on account of their ownership of the said resources, might only be exploiting the advantages 
that their productivity-enhancing resources had earned them (e.g. good quality land). In the 
end, neither rent-extraction by non-productive capitalists, such as commercial and financial 
ones, nor rent-extraction by owners of scarce resources, are necessarily detrimental, at least 
to the extent that they facilitate an amplified reproduction of the system of wealth creation: 
commercial capital by helping realize profits through selling the results of production; interest-
bearing capital by providing the necessary finance; and resource-owners by making available 
highly productive resources14. In any case, these rents (i.e. the appropriation of the surplus 
by those who did not directly contribute to generating it), provided not excessive, represent 
no major systemic challenge, according to Marx. The real threat to the system’s reproduction 
lies elsewhere, he reckons, in the class struggle between dominant and dominated classes. 
Since, as he asserts, it is only labor in the sphere of production that really creates new value, 
all profits, including those generated in this sphere, are but rents accruing to the owners of 
capital. Therefore, it is the class struggle between capitalists (who own capital) and workers 
(who create new value but do not get it) around the created value, and not competition among 
the dominant classes as Ricardo asserts, which heralds the system’s doom. 
Allegedly drawing on Marx’s thinking, contemporary non-orthodox economists and 
sociologists have developed a distributive analysis focusing on rents. But in fact, and 
unsurprisingly, some of the basic ideas diverge from Marx’s. 
An important attempt at operationalizing a ‘Marxisant’15 narrative of rising inequalities in terms 
of processes of rent-extraction – an attempt with an ostensibly theoretically informed 
perspective – is offered in Mariana Mazzucato’s 2018 book, The Value of Everything. This 
reviews two core developments of contemporary capitalism, financialisation and innovation, 
while also focusing on economic actors who saw their market power boosted by a series of 
regulations and deregulations. 
The analysis is set in the context of a thoughtful discussion of what constitutes value in 
economics – histories of economics and national accounting systems are brought in – and 
this enables the author to distinguish value creation from value extraction. Value creation, 
which materializes within the ‘production boundary’ of an economy, brings about wages and 
profits on the income side and goods and services on the product side. Value extraction, in 
turn, is undertaken by activities within the non-production boundary16 and gives rise to rents. 
 
14 The preceding analyses in this paragraph essentially follow Mazzucato’s (2018) summing up of Marx’s ideas 
as set out in the Theories of Surplus-Value (vol. IV of Capital), with which I agree. 
15 Jackson and Grusky (2018)’s term. 
16 Even as the analysis documents different processes of value extraction by those at the non-productive 
frontier, the ultimate purpose is to re-conceptualize economic value in terms of public value. Arguably, the 
central message in this excellent book could be summarized thus: value extraction – rents – is not necessarily 
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Having begun by establishing this distinction very much in the tradition of classical 
economics, Mazzucato then reviews the positions sustained by Ricardo and Marx regarding 
the relations they see arising between those within the production boundary and those 
outside it. For Ricardo, these relations are semi-parasitic in character, as evidenced in the 
purely extractive relationship that landlords maintain with their capitalist tenants; for Marx, 
these relations may be functional (provided they are not abusive), as evidenced in the 
relationship that can be created and continue to exist between interest-bearing and 
commercial capital and production capitalists. Mazzucato, after siding with Marx’s view of 
rents as being part of the capitalist game, provided they are not excessive,17 turns to 
documenting ongoing excesses based essentially on asymmetric market powers which 
endanger the system’s reproduction.  
The first process Mazzucato examines that can give rise to excesses is financialisation. 
Mazzucato shows the non-productive financial sector, an outgrowth of financial institutions 
spurred on by deregulation of financial markets, to be responsible for the biggest chunk of 
wealth-extraction. Her well-documented discussion sheds light on why and how the realm of 
finance has been absorbing ever bigger shares of total profits, a process largely unconnected 
with fostering productive activities and even detrimental to them. It also tackles the 
relationship of mutual causation between the growth of finance and that of inequality. 
Moreover, it shows that the problem is not confined to inter-sector predation. Non-financial 
firms, under the guidance of shareholder-value-maximizing CEOs, are increasingly behaving 
‘financially’, ultimately taking financial returns as the benchmark for their profit allocation 
decisions. This, alongside abusive, self-serving strategies by CEOs, hampers those 
companies’ ability to make investments and create wealth.18 The productive-non-productive 
cleavage is internalized within the productive firm, which means that a (Ricardian?) struggle 
between profits and rents is taking place as we speak. 
More generally, Mazzucato describes three main processes of wealth extraction, all of them 
powerful engines of inequality.19 The first is the aforementioned private-private extraction, i.e. 
an extractive relationship between non-productive and productive activities that takes place 
both between firms (the financial sector extracting from the non-financial sector) and within 
firms (CEOs and shareholders capturing – instead of investing – companies’ profits). The 
second process is public-private extraction, whereby investments are undertaken by 
governments at the initial stage of the development of new processes or products, but profits 
 
problematic, provided it is not excessive; and value creation could be more like processes that have public 
value, i.e. states more actively shaping markets. 
17 Also, as an additional illustration, in the so-called neo-Schumpeterian tradition, it is the search for 
extraordinary profits, Mazzucato’s ‘rents’, which moves the technological frontier forwards. The prime mover 
may gain a lot before her innovation is diffused or even overcome by a new one.  
18 As pointed in Palma (2019), in 2018, buybacks – the use of firm’s profits to buy firm’s own shares with a view 
to enhancing their market value – alone became larger than overall capital expenditure among the S&P 
corporations. See also Mazzucato (2018) for data on previous periods. 
19 Palma (2019), in the same way, considers that ‘increasing market inequality in the OECD has really been 
about extracting value created by others, or of cashing-in on assets already in existence’. (53) And, also in line 
with Mazzucato, he sees the ‘state subsidizing the rent-seeking practices of free-riding capital’ (54) through 
various policies, such as unconditional bailouts of financial institutions and regressive taxation. 
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are privatized by firms that are subsequently granted the patents, as is happening with 
increasing ease. These firms, in turn, are not doing a good job when it comes to spreading 
the benefits of investment, especially when their activities inhibit technological progress, as 
they often do. This is specially the case with the ICT and pharmaceutical industries,20 whose 
favored processes of strategic patenting and patent-trolling21 are described in detail in the 
book. To these industries, we might add the burgeoning phenomenon of ‘academic 
capitalism’ taking root in the academic publishing oligopoly, where profit margins are as 
formidable as those of big companies in the automotive and pharmaceutical sectors 
(O’Donovan, 2019). Finally, the third process mentioned is that of collective-private extraction 
taking place in the ‘sharing economy’, whereby consumers, while consuming a service, 
inadvertently produce a benefit (their personal data, their attention) to be free-lunched by the 
service provider.22 
Roughly speaking, rent generation is equated with transfers of wealth from locations where 
it is created to others where it is not. This reasoning appears to be akin to Marx’s. However, 
the similarity with Marx turns out to be superficial. In fact, for Marx, transfers from wealth-
creators (value-creators, actually) to wealth-extractors could only take place between those 
who actually created new value, the workers, and those who exploited them by seizing it in 
its entirety, the capitalists. But for Mazzucato, wealth creation requires real investment by 
capitalists. This position, while avoiding one difficulty, raises two others, or so it seems.  
The problem she, along with many others in heterodox economics and post-liberal sociology, 
openly wishes to avoid is the endorsement of Marx’s labor value and exploitation theories, 
and she does so by equating wealth creation with capitalist real investment. But then two 
other problems surface. The first has to do with capitalist ‘anthropology’. So, however careful 
Mazzucato is not to make a distinction between ‘good’ (those who invest) and ‘bad’ (those 
who speculate) capitalists as she recognizes normal finance motives within the productive 
boundary, her analysis posits the firm as a third party, vulnerable to plunder. This plunder 
takes the form of ‘maximizing profit distribution to shareholders and CEOs’, a process that 
replaces ‘profit retention for investment in the firm’. But what, we wonder, is left of the 
capitalist firm if we abstract its share owners and CEOs? If we follow Keynes ([1936]1960), 
are not capital owners (and their managers), by definition, on the lookout for capital 
valorization, considering a portfolio of rates of return for alternative investments? This being 
so, the idea of the capitalist firm as an independent entity being preyed on by actors inside it 
seems rather unconvincing. And while there is the possibility that this problem could be 
tackled by some form of regulation of firms’ governance, a second, perhaps more important, 
problem lingers. This is that Mazzucato’s analysis does not engage critically with profits that 
 
20 Here she also includes a discussion of abusive pricing, and thus introduces another mechanism of rent 
extraction: by the private sector from consumers. 
21 Patent-trolling: ‘the strategic holding of patents, not to develop or commercialize the underlying idea but 
deliberately to collect royalties through patent enforcement’. (Mazzucato 2018 p.192) 
22 The second and third means of extracting rents are, accordingly, referred to by Palma (2019) as the activity 
of ‘free-rid[ing] on public goods paid by others.’ (37) 
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accrue to legitimate capitalists, i.e. those within the production boundary who are involved in 
processes of wealth creation. A comparison with Marx may be helpful.  
As well-known, Marx did not directly take issue with inequality. His inquiry was into the 
reproduction of the capitalist economic system, in the process of which he uncovered its inner 
self-destructive logic, which, as already stated, is driven by the antagonism between the two 
fundamental classes. One way or another, however, social justice (my term, not Marx’s) 
would be served. Mazzucato, for her part, has other theoretical interests and concerns. 
Following the heterodox economics tradition, she focusses on investigating and 
distinguishing the forces of systemic destruction – excessive rent extraction – from the forces 
that are potentially constructive – profit making.23 Hence the separation of profits, which may 
be directed into real investments, from rents, which threaten to deplete profits. But this 
theoretical undertaking, as it concentrates on the profit-rent distribution, still lacks an 
analytical tool to assess existing profit-wage distributions. How much profit-taking (e.g. within 
the productive boundary) is too much?24 
A recent heterodox contributor to the debate, Palma (2019), suggests that rent-extractivism 
accounts for both the non-productive uses of profits (when profits are used not to invest but 
to increase rents), as described by Mazzucato, and the ‘hierarchical pay structures in big 
corporations’ (p. 47). The author argues that current pay structures within corporations do not 
recognize the social contribution of labor, a fact that is reflected in a stagnation of wages 
despite increased productivity in the labor market as a whole.25 Mazzucato’s analysis also 
refers to the compression of the wage bill as one among many financialisation strategies 
used to pump up profit margins inside the production boundary; and in the end, both 
contributions, Mazzucato’s and Palma’s, indicate the co-habitation of these two phenomena 
in contemporary inequalities – capital-capital and capital-labor extractions – thus suggesting 
(without fully exploring) the presence of an underlying rents language.  
 
23 For Palma (2019), an author from this same tradition, ‘the legitimacy of a small elite to appropriate such a 
large proportion of the social product rests on [its] capacity to use it productively...It can do this by reinvesting 
most of that huge share.’ (38) 
24The problem with following Marx’s ideas to their conclusion seems to be his labor value and exploitation 
theories, which, as stated, are difficult to make sense of under present-day conditions of labor substitution. 
Many contributions, such as Mazzucato’s, even whilst claiming Marx as the inspiration for their thinking, when 
it comes to distributive issues, stop short of embracing his full view. But, the self-devouring logic of capitalist 
systems uncovered by Marx – minus teleology – is fully accepted by Mazzucato. The separation between profits 
and rents is key to her view that this self-destructive logic can and should be opposed; such opposition creates 
an opportunity for different experiments, including with more public involvement in the shaping of markets. 
Alternatively, taking Marx’s suggestion that the divide between profits and rents is not clear-cut, that it may even 
be non-existent, without necessarily embracing his specific exploitation theory, requires further investigation of 
the processes through which the socially-generated surplus is extracted. These processes we shall explore with 
the assistance of contributions from the field of sociology. 
25 A whole array of forms of extraction is listed by Palma, who discusses ‘those who live from extracting value 
created by others, from extortionary finance, by capturing policy and avoiding taxes, by tormenting consumers 
or by appropriating the rents of natural resources, and so on.’ (Palma 2019, 26) In particular, he notes that the 
relationship between the increasing share of the top 10% and the decreasing share of the bottom 40%, which 
emerges from the data as quite a widespread phenomenon, has been shaped by policies protecting higher 
incomes and exposing workers at the bottom to loss of income. 
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Summing up the definitions and arguments in this Section, we see that rents are conceived 
as pecuniary advantages that are extracted by a group of economic actors (class or class 
fraction) from other groups. To the extent that economic distribution is anchored in a system 
of wealth creation, the extractive relationship - essentially a market power game with class- 
(or class fraction-) struggle undertones - takes place between those engaged with wealth 
creation and hoarders of valuable resources who are not directly involved with wealth 
creation.  
*** 
The sociological analyses of inequalities that we review next address some of the hard 
questions posed in this Section. In these analyses, as in the heterodox economics 
contributions discussed, rents are positioned at the very core of contemporary inequalities. 
But distinctions between profits, wages and rents are redrawn. As an illustration of this 
redrawing, rents are spotted in labor markets at large, in addition to emerging from 
asymmetrical relations between private capitals and capital and labor. Moreover, they are 
related to distinctions which go beyond natural abilities, such as those which indicate training 
or are ascriptive,26 and which separate out categories of workers: migrants and natives, 
ethnic minorities and mainstream ethnicities, men and women, high-skilled and low-skilled. 
Rents are even suggested as a form of compensation for perceived unfair distribution, e.g. 
minimum wages. Incidentally, when it comes to labor markets, heterodox economics lacks a 
systematic treatment of high salaries, whereas orthodox economics has only natural abilities 
to offer as a basis for durable labor rents. Furthermore, distinctions between profits and rents 
are implicitly challenged, by increased attention being given to wealth ownership as a class-
related phenomenon. 
 
4. The ‘Long Shadow of Marx’ – II 
Within sociological analyses, a subset of contributions draws heavily on rents when 
approaching contemporary social stratification and inequalities. In this Section, I review a 
group of definitions and arguments within this larger subset that directly address the lacunae 
identified in the economic arguments discussed thus far. Without aiming at complete 
coverage, the selection brings in both new solutions and new problems that combine to 
supply a richer narrative of rents. Thus, I start this Section by presenting contributions by 
David Grusky and his co-authors which address two dimensions of rents not previously 
tackled: rents of labor and ‘egalitarian’ rents. Subsequently, I shall review contributions by 
Aage Sorensen, Charles Tilly and Pierre Bourdieu which accommodate a variety of rents 
within a unified conceptual and theoretical corpus, the structural theories of rents-based 
inequality. Marx’s heritage is often cited, not so much out of concern for the reproduction of 
the economic system, as in the heterodox economics reviewed here, but for bringing to the 
fore the issue of struggle between social classes. 
 
26 Characteristics of people which are beyond their control and which are used to position them in social 
stratification systems. Examples include sex, age, race, ethnicity, place of birth. 
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So, starting with David Grusky and his co-authors, in various contributions and collaborations, 
these authors define rents in the following related ways: ‘compensation in excess of what 
would prevail under perfect competition’ (Jackson and Grusky 2018, 15); ‘returns on an asset 
(e.g. labor) in excess of what is necessary to keep that asset in production in a fully 
competitive economy’ (Red Bird and Grusky 2015, 2; Grusky and Hill, 2018, 2); ‘[r]ents exist 
(a) when demand for an asset exceeds supply;27 (b) when the supply of that asset is fixed 
through natural means (e.g. shortage of talent) or through social or political barriers that 
artificially restrict supply’ (Grusky and Hill, 2018, 2).  
On the face of it, these definitions seem not to diverge fundamentally from neoclassical ones: 
they share the notion of rent as a price above the perfectly competitive one (which, of course, 
cannot be said to be the case of natural talents in the neoclassical account). Recall that this 
was one form of rents, monopoly rents, alluded to by Alchian when referring to rents obtained 
by rent-seeking behavior. However, unlike Alchian’s rendition of the neoclassical account, 
these analyses hold that monopoly rents do not tend to disappear, as they grow out of 
restrictions of competition that are actively supported by social and political forces – an aspect 
that worried Tullock, Stiglitz, Hacker, and Pierson, among others. The authors of the analyses 
also stop short of passing a plainly negative judgment on rents. 
So, while the papers concentrate on labor market rents, they envisage the departure from the 
competitive benchmark as possibly representing either a situation in which ‘regressive rents’ 
are granted to top earners (e.g. advantageous taxation), or one in which ‘egalitarian rents’ 
are granted to earners at the bottom (e.g. statutory minimum wages), or even as some 
combination of both. Current inequalities, as it happens, reflect an outstanding imbalance 
between bottom and top rents. They are, at least partly, the outcome of public policies having 
increasingly created opportunities for regressive rents, as well as having dismantled existing 
opportunities for egalitarian ones. In other words, inequalities result from successful rent-
seeking activities intent on rent creation at the top and rent destruction at the bottom.28 
Evidence of opportunities for rents at the bottom being destroyed are the decline in 
unionization and the fall in the real value of the minimum wage, as well as the shrinking of 
the element of progressivity in the tax-and-transfer system in the US. Conversely, among 
new opportunities to collect rents at the top, Red Bird and Grusky (2015) identify: ‘occupation 
rent’ (increasing restriction of entry to high-value occupations), ‘capital rent’ (e.g. the 
expansion of concentrated and union-free industries), ‘education rent’ (the diminishing supply 
of educated labor, thanks to institutionalized bottlenecks), and ‘CEOs’ growing capacity to 
secure sweetheart compensation deals’. Jackson and Grusky (2018) depict an even more 
complex social stratification, with recipient classes collecting ‘upper-class’, ‘working-class’, 
‘country’, and ‘race/gender/immigrant’ rents. This new classification is meant to 
 
27 Fabio Petri notes that according to the neoclassical theory, the correct phrasing should be, not that demand 
exceeds supply, because demand in this theory is not a fixed quantity but depends on price, but that demand 
is greater than that which would be enough for the resource to obtain a price equal to the supply price. I thank 
him for the remark. 
28 This is, the authors claim, their Marxisant class-struggle moment. 
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accommodate narratives of class conflicts among distinct strata within the working class, now 
redefined in terms of ascriptive cleavages (e.g. gender, place of birth, ethnicity). 
Incidentally, Hacker and Pierson’s (2010) winner-take-all discussion, to which Grusky and 
Hill’s (2018) work refers, and which they republish in their edited volume, similarly details 
policy interventions in the US that were key to the processes of rent-destruction-rent-creation 
in the above sense. These are spread through areas such as industrial relations (restrictions 
on unionization); corporate governance and executive compensation (policy drift); taxation 
(cuts in rates, loopholes and exemptions, increased IRS oversight of poor and middle-class 
earners’ tax returns, and a decline in the oversight of high income returns); and financial 
markets (deregulation). Those interventions have so shaped income distribution dynamics in 
the US and other rich economies as to  increase the concentration of income at the top, cause 
stagnation at the bottom, and shrink the range of middle income brackets.29  
To sum up, we see that three theoretical contributions by Grusky and his co-authors to a 
rents-based account of inequality should be highlighted. The first contribution is the 
observation that the taking of rents is widespread and does not show any signs of fading 
away, instead, it seems to be dominating the distributive landscape; the second is the idea 
that rents are associated with social and political forces struggling to force their interests into 
existing institutions; the third is the identification of different rents accruing to different groups 
of workers, following recognition of (potential or actual) struggles among fractions of the 
working class. However, there seems to be a notable shortcoming in these writers’ approach: 
beyond the labor market and the struggles between different groups with a view to 
institutionalizing rewards rather than ‘competitive gains’, i.e. the gains that would prevail 
under free competition, not much is said on the role played by wealth concentration. The 
competitive equilibrium itself is not engaged with in a critical way as itself reflecting a previous 
distribution of endowments or wealth. 
The second group of authors we shall look at confronts the relationship between rents and 
inequalities from a different – though not incompatible – angle. Rents (to be defined) are also 
traced to social closures, but they are approached from the perspective of the background 
social structure, rather than from the perspective of market failures or restrictions to 
competition. In this sense, they directly call into question the initial distribution of 
endowments. The first author reviewed is Aage Sorensen. His seminal work (Sorensen 1996) 
 
29 Jackson and Grusky’s highly imaginative 2018 paper traces a political sociology in recent changes in rent-
creation and rent-destruction processes which, according to them, were perceived and politically captured by 
current populist politicians. Previous decades saw advances in compensatory rents for deprived groups 
(women, migrants, ethnic minorities) alongside a withdrawal of regressive rents for symmetrically dominant 
groups (men, natives, whites), all of these undertaken by progressive politicians (social democrats in Europe, 
democrats in the US). These advances were perceived as unfair or unearned by swathes of the population who 
did not benefit from them, and who ended up in the lap of right wing populists. The narrative of a shrinking 
middle, measured in terms of a diminishing income share, is contested by Palma (2019), for whom the declining 
well-being of the middle class has been wrongly seen as resulting from a shrinking income share. By contrast, 
Kenworthy (2014), who espouses the shrinking middle hypothesis, argues that the apparent income stability of 
the middle range of the income distribution has to do with an increasing percentage of dual-earner households 
in that range. 
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presents a series of definitions and redefinitions of rents, and a view on inequality which the 
author claims is reminiscent of Marx’s own view. 
Sorensen argues that inequalities may have a structural character. This means they do not 
result exclusively or mainly from individual choices or individual achievements, but may also, 
and importantly, arise from existing social positions in the social structure. In other words, the 
properties of social positions may be more relevant in explaining the income of their 
occupants than are these occupants’ individual productive traits. The advantages so 
obtained, i.e., independently of the productive traits of the positions’ occupants, Sorensen 
calls rents. Not surprisingly, the ‘independence from individuals’ characteristics’ clause is not 
normatively anodyne. Rent is an advantage the individual has not earned (1335), it is not a 
reward for merit or effort; it is, again, unrelated to the ‘efforts and abilities of people occupying 
positions in social structure’ (1336).  
Since social positions are characterized by the exclusive possession (or absence of 
possession) of valuable (productive) resources, it is ownership, i.e. the ability to control 
access to those resources, the property of social positions, which enables those occupying 
them to claim rents. So, the owner of a resource is ‘paid for his ability to enforce his ownership’ 
(1337). We are back to Flux’s nineteenth century perception of ownership as the key 
ingredient in rents, in the ambit of the discussion of rents of capital (‘the best productive 
facilities’). 
In principle, any productive asset or ‘valuable resource’, not only capital, may give its owner 
access to some sort of rent (1338). A rent may be paid for the use of capital or labor; or for a 
unique combination thereof (technology); or for abilities that cannot be developed by training 
alone (which, in principle, are not linked to social positions, an exception to his previous 
general definition). In this connection, Sorensen refers to a series of structural elements 
whose existence underpins these claims: internal labor markets (that protects insiders from 
the competition of outsiders); the long-lasting effects of rents of innovation (i.e. when the 
initial rents are capitalized, and capital is transmitted to heirs and then used to generate new 
rents); land ownership; monopolies artificially obtained, including those favoring both capital 
owners (e.g. licenses) and workers (e.g. unionization, minimum wage).  
However, whilst claiming Marx’s legacy when starting by depicting the relationship between 
the owners of valuable resources and the dispossessed as adversarial in character, 
Sorensen departs from Marx’s ideas when depicting the nature of rents as distinct from that 
of profits. To be sure, initially (openly following Marx), he equates rents with profits: ‘rents are 
what we usually call profits.’ But then he adds that the more accurate idea is of rents being 
‘excess profits’ – excess in the sense that, being a payment to the exclusive owner of an 
asset merely for having the right to use it, and not for the actual benefit it provides, rents ‘are 
not needed to secure the availability of a good, they are not earned, and their payment may 
make everyone less well-off’ (1336). Profits (without excess), unlike rents, correspond to 
some degree of effort, he adds; they are a pecuniary compensation for savings, i.e. for the 
sacrifice of consumption in the past. This is an idea that does not hold up when it comes to 
heirs, who did not sacrifice any past consumption to collect the wealth they end up inheriting 
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– as Sorensen concedes. But this seems to be a difficult idea to make sense of, in any case, 
in view of the multiple opportunities available for an occupant of an advantageous social 
position to come up with wealth (Bourdieu captures that well, as we shall see, when pointing 
out that inheritance takes many forms, including cultural, educational, and social capital).  
However, why – and for how much and how long – should past savings entitle someone, the 
exclusive owners of the valuable assets, to profits? It seems as if, to avoid the difficulties 
inherent in Marx’s exploitation theory as Sorensen himself puts it – a theory which supposes 
a relationship of value extraction between proprietors and dispossessed workers, and thus 
that all profits are rents – Sorensen carves out a mid-way theory of rents as distinct from 
profits. This theory, however, does not sit comfortably with his starting point of exclusive 
ownership: that ownership is exclusive of social position and is behind claims to both profits 
and rents. 
In short, Sorensen’s idea of rents and their many guises as a key representation of 
inequalities implies that social structure and social closures must be brought into the 
explanation of inequalities from the very start. His argument implies, in particular, that labor 
market inequalities may as well be represented in term of social closures, as seems to be 
widely recognized now in sociological thinking. His negative assessment of rents as unearned 
and inefficient, however, ends up leading him to distinguishing profits from rents, as already 
stated, on the grounds of the supposed merit of the former (arguably a position not entirely 
rejected by heterodox economists!). It also leads him to assess as equally undesirable both 
top and bottom rents. In the end, while the sources of rents are for him dual – they arise from 
the enforcement of exclusive property rights (the ‘initial endowments’ of the economists’ 
market fiction); and they also arise from restrictions to competition (including labor market 
regulations favoring workers) – he does not envisage the latter interventions as eventually 
providing legitimate compensation to the latter group of people for the guaranteed exclusive 
property rights of property owners (pace Grusky!) 
In contrast, Charles Tilly, in Durable Inequality (Tilly, 1998), tackles the relationship between 
advantaged and disadvantaged social positions in more openly conflictual, ‘class struggle’, 
terms than Sorensen does. He does so by investigating mechanisms of social closure, while 
displaying a view of the social structure that is clearly more critical than Sorensen’s.  
Taking this approach, Tilly makes two points that trigger a reconfiguration of Sorensen’s 
structuralism. The first is that the idea of structure, as in ‘structural inequality’, should be 
complemented with the idea of duration: once people find themselves in social positions, they 
rarely move away from these. The second point addresses the way advantages are extracted 
from valuable resources. Tilly explores two such ways, while also declaring a Marxian 
affiliation: exploitation and opportunity hoarding. Accordingly, he defines rents as rewards 
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accruing to people who have ‘sequestered’ valuable resources, either through exploitation or 
through opportunity hoarding.30   
For Tilly, exploitation, in a slightly different version from Marx’s conception of it, involves the 
possessors of the valuable resources enlisting the effort of others, even as they exclude them 
from the full value added by that effort31. (Although deviating from Marx’s more precise 
definition, to the effect that all value added comes from labor, this definition still leaves 
unsettled the question of what this full value added amounts to). Opportunity hoarding, while 
not involving the action of enlisting the effort of others, also involves the exclusion of others 
from access to valuable resources hoarded by an exclusive group.32 Exploitation, typically, is 
a relationship between elite and non-elite groups of various kinds – capital and labor is one 
such pair of opposites; opportunity hoarding, in turn, is typically a relationship between non-
elite groups – an example of an opportunity hoarder is a migrant network. But these 
relationships, Tilly adds, are not necessarily thus: elites may well hoard opportunities; and 
non-elite groups may well exploit other non-elites. 
In any case, it is the different degrees of access to valuable resources, reinforced by the 
operation of the above mechanisms, which create what Tilly calls the categorical inequalities 
of our time. Boundaries separate out beneficiaries from those excluded from benefits, forming 
pairs of symmetrical categories. The categories, in turn, vary through multiple dimensions: 
capital ownership, ethnicity, gender, place of birth, age, citizenship. (This exercise in 
categorization is similar to Grusky and his co-authors’ description of ‘opposing solidary 
groups’.) Pairs of ‘exterior categories’ (e.g. those defined by sex differences) are usually 
replicated in the interior of social organizations (e.g. in the labor market), producing ‘interior 
categories’ as well (e.g. differential promotion and career paths for men and women doing 
the same job). Categorizations lived by people, in turn, by shaping their subjects’ personal 
experiences, end up producing objective differences in capacities, propensities, and social 
relations, which are then reproduced in other settings. Here, Tilly is challenging the neat 
difference that is sometimes assumed to exist between natural and acquired abilities (in this 
paper, represented by Foley’s and Bonar’s positions), suggesting that capacities are, to a 
 
30The question of primitive accumulation is bypassed: ‘Let me vault over the crevasse of a fascinating, important 
question: how by force, ruse, purchase, inheritance or legal device groups of actors acquire control over 
valuable resources in the first place.’ (87) 
31 Exploitation ‘occurs wherever well-connected people control valuable resources from which they extract 
returns by deploying the effort of others, whom they exclude from the full value added by that effort. The “value” 
in question may of course be monetary, but it may also take the form of power, deference, perquisites, services, 
goods, or protections. Categorically organized exploitation plays a part in almost all processes that engender 
durable inequality.’ (91) 
32 Opportunity hoarding: ‘When members of a categorically bounded network acquire access to a resource that 
is valuable, renewable, subject to monopoly, supportive of network activities, and enhanced by the network’s 
modus operandi, network members regularly hoard their access to the resource, creating beliefs and practices 
that sustain their control. As in exploitation, a boundary separates beneficiaries from others, while unequal 
relations across the boundary connect them. In opportunity hoarding, however, beneficiaries do not enlist the 
efforts of outsiders but instead exclude them from access to the relevant resources. Immigrant niches provide 
strong examples of this second inequality-promoting mechanism.’ (91)  
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considerable extent, shaped by experience. This point is also reminiscent of Bourdieu’s 
insight into the way in which a worker’s occupational experience can be capable of de-skilling 
her –  a point we shall return to later.  
Unequal categories involve the unequal distribution of goods. In Tilly’s terminology: 
‘autonomous goods’, i.e. wealth, income, and health; and ‘relative goods’, the means of 
getting the former, i.e. prestige, power, and clientele. (Taken together, they make up a 
broader version of Sorensen’s valuable resources). Perhaps more disturbingly, unequal 
categories also involve differentiation along the dimension of what Tilly calls ‘individual 
human capital’. This differentiation expresses the fact that human capacities are strongly 
shaped by the experiences of lives lived in segregated categories and a variety of settings. 
Its components include differential nutrition, information, socialization, beliefs and emotional 
experiences. Taken together, these components translate into differential performance (e.g. 
in the labor market).33 As we move on to Bourdieu’s contribution, ‘capitals’ is the name this 
sociologist gives to the goods and capacities so described by Tilly, and which, in the end, 
underpin claims to rents by their possessors. 
Unsurprisingly, for Tilly, categorical inequalities are objectionable – and not only on account 
of the unfair social closure processes from which they derive. They are also objectionable as 
end states in themselves. This is especially so when the situation causes ‘harm to the 
excluded, deprives them of access to what could be collective goods, and produces a net 
underuse of potentially life-enhancing talent.’ (85) In an unambiguous way, and in contrast 
with Sorensen’s position, Tilly does not deem free competition an appropriate, let alone a 
sufficient, normative benchmark to assess these (rents-based) inequalities. 
To the extent that Tilly’s exploitation and hoarding categories resonate with Marx’s 
exploitation and expropriation categories, as these appear in the discussion on primitive 
accumulation in Capital, a parallel with Marx is in order.  
In his chapters on primitive accumulation, Marx investigated the foundational process 
conducive to the capital and labor antagonistic relationship. He described this process as 
beginning with the expropriation from workers of the objective conditions for the realization 
of their work and as culminating in exploitation. The latter, he conceptualized as an additional 
form of expropriation from workers – of the fruits of their labor. Tilly’s opportunity hoarding, in 
turn, while not straightforward expropriation in Marx’s sense, and possibly only 
appropriation,34 might be seen as a precondition for exploitation, even if not as fully-fledged 
as Marx had imagined. In other words, when opportunities are hoarded by a group, those 
excluded become vulnerable to exploitation by the hoarders, who may then grab at least part 
of the value created by the excluded. In a way, opportunity hoarding in Tilly’s sense takes on 
 
33 Provocatively, Tilly proposes that econometric exercises aimed at estimating the weight of various individual 
characteristics in the explanation of differential remuneration – which, by the way, usually end up with big 
residues due to ‘unobservable variables’ – should be turned on their head: they should be used to assess what 
is left of, say, the individual worker after ‘categorization’ has had its effect on him. 
34 Expropriation: taking away what someone has; appropriation: taking possession of something previously up 
for grabs. 
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an even more general meaning than Marx’s notion of expropriation. It may be generalized to 
account both for workers being vulnerable to exploitation by capitalist hoarders of the best 
resources and for workers being excluded from access to the best opportunities because 
these are being granted to other groups of workers. In the latter case, we might think of 
oppositions such as native versus migrant workers, whites versus blacks, men versus 
women, college graduates versus less educated, and so on.  
An additional layer of understanding is contributed by Bourdieu in terms of clarifying the 
nature and variety of valuable resources that give rise to rents, as well as the likely trajectories 
of individuals and groups within the social space, given the structural characteristics 
summarized in Tilly’s Durable Inequality. In fact, in Distinction, Bourdieu introduces both a 
multidimensional concept of capital and a somewhat dynamic approach to social structure, 
shedding light on the processes of its long-term re-production or social structuration.35 The 
latter is thus pictured as a generalized struggle for capital, or ‘relative scarcity’ – centered on 
distinction and rents – between classes and among class fractions.36 It is important to 
emphasize that, in contrast to the neoclassical usage, the notion of relative scarcity in the 
hands of Bourdieu only makes sense in the context of class and class-fraction struggles. 
Bourdieu pictures the search for distinction as efforts by symmetrically positioned social 
groups to emulate the groups above them (efforts to ‘up class’ themselves) and to devalue 
those immediately below them (efforts to ‘down class’ others). In this search, the object of 
desire is capital, whose type and importance vary in accordance with the different settings 
where the struggles are taking place – religious, cultural, political, economic, artistic. And yet, 
despite these constant struggles, major shifts in the social space are unlikely to succeed. 
Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose, the French adage goes, or, in Bourdieu’s 
(translated into English) own words, ‘to change so as to conserve’ (157). 
Unsurprisingly, the trajectories of individuals within the social space are not fluid. Individuals 
are subject to the forces that structure this space – mechanisms of elimination or channeling 
– and to inertia. The mechanisms are the various rules of the game regulating different 
contests; but they are not totally unconnected with the forces of inertia.  Inertia, in turn, stands 
for the properties that individuals possess which identify their social position. These comprise 
individuals’ goods (economic and cultural, such as qualifications) and dispositions 
(worldviews, perceptions, practical sense), or, as Bourdieu also puts it, objectified and 
internalized forms of capital. It turns out that individuals’ lifelong trajectories, from social origin 
to social destiny, are highly correlated with class origin (this is Tilly’s duration in other words). 
 
35 The discussion below is almost exclusively based on Part II of Distinction, entitled ‘The Economy of Practices’ 
(97-256) 
36 To be sure, rents are not the explicit subject of Distinction (1976, 1984); nor are the advantages Bourdieu 
analyzes translatable exclusively into money, although they can be so translated. But it seems pointless not to 
make the connection. After all, the search for distinction is the search for recognition of a special value that 
belongs to oneself (or one’s group) – and oneself (or one’s group) only – no matter the currency in which this 
recognition is expressed. 
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As for social groups’ trajectories, these typically preserve the relative positions of the groups. 
Bourdieu notes that the ceaseless competition between dominated and dominant groups, 
and between fractions within these groups, ends up displacing upwards the entire distribution 
of advantages, whilst keeping relative positions roughly unchanged. This is likely to be so 
because changes and reactive changes cancel each other out. Educational competition – 
getting educational capital is the preferred strategy utilized by dominated classes or class 
fractions to move up – provides an illustration of this. As education is democratized, i.e. 
extended to the dominated classes, the race for secondary schooling gives way to the race 
for college degrees and, subsequently, for further desirable certifications, as a result of 
defensive reactions by the dominant classes, who fear down classing. Thus the unintended 
consequence of a system for equalizing opportunities is the reproduction of inequalities, or 
their escalation (we recall here Foley’s remark in Section 2). Over-education, an unintended 
result of the search for up classing in the face of a shortage of jobs, has the effect of working 
against less-qualified workers, who are out-competed by more educated ones. More 
generally, dominant groups try to hoard opportunities either by upscaling the stakes or by 
simply closing off opportunities by imposing requirements for certificates, licenses, patents, 
job descriptions, curricula vitae, and the like.  
The concept of capital is crucial to this analysis. Bourdieu’s capital, in contrast to Marx’s, is 
not singular or reducible to a single form. Hence, it is not only economic, but also cultural, 
educational, social, sometimes also occupational, academic, political, and symbolic. 
Economic capital includes wealth, income, rural and urban property, shares, industrial and 
commercial profits, wages, salaries. Social capital summarizes social connections or social 
ties. Educational capital is attested by level of schooling; but its efficacy is associated with 
previous possession of cultural capital, giving rise to academic capital, i.e. educational 
certification is the certification of cultural capital. The overlap between educational and 
cultural capitals is particularly important because it signals the precedence of social origin 
over educational training in formal institutions: the latter can hardly make up for defects in 
upbringing. 
His view of the diversity of guises capital may take is the result of Bourdieu, like Marx, defining 
capital not as goods, but as a social relation. But while, for Marx, capital is a social relation in 
the sense that, under the guise of a bundle of goods, there hides a relationship of 
expropriation of workers by capitalists, for Bourdieu, capital is a social relation in the sense 
of being an ‘energy’ (his term). It is something that confers on people a power (to do things, 
to be things) that acquires form, value and efficacy only in the specific social fields where it 
is applied. This does not mean capitals may not be transposed from one field to another. It 
should also be noted that this capacity to undergo conversion is one of the advantages of 
economic capital: for example, economically wealthy families may buy distinctive educational 
capital for their heirs much more easily than less wealthy ones may. Also, inherited cultural 
capital may boost educational capital in a way that economic capital alone may not. 
Cultural capital is perhaps the most original idea that Bourdieu offers in connection with his 
discussion of capital. It refers to social origin in the sense of upbringing and family 
background, and includes early cultural investments in children – when and where habitus 
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(ways of perceiving, thinking, and acting in the social world), a distinctive marker of class, is 
inculcated. Cultural capital mediates between the space of material conditions and that of 
lifestyles. It provides advantages in the educational system by enhancing the benefits of 
formal education. It also confers on individuals socially valuable attributes such as valuing 
knowledge and experience.37 We could perhaps say that, for Bourdieu, cultural capital is just 
as infrastructural as economic capital is. 
It is by now clear that for Bourdieu possession of capital marks out social classes and class 
fractions. His conception of class differentiation, however, diverges from Marx’s. It is not a 
distinction between those possessing and those deprived of any kind of capital, but rather a 
gradient of possession is assumed. Moreover, as already stated, Bourdieu is interested in 
volume and composition, i.e. the different weights of different capitals in each bundle. These 
differences are, for example, mobilized when, in the analysis of fractions of the dominant 
classes, he distinguishes those for which economic capital is important from those for which 
cultural or educational capital are more so. This heterogeneity provides different advantages 
in different settings, and these are evidently stronger when they accumulate. Symmetrically, 
interactions among weak capitals may engender deaccumulation and disadvantages. For 
example, a weak occupational capital in the form of a poor job experience may interact with 
previous cultural and educational capitals to de-skill workers. 
Finally, beyond positions in the ‘relations of production’ (Bourdieu’s term) – which involve, for 
example, differences in income, occupation, educational level or qualifications – there is an 
array of secondary characteristics which, although not formally stated, contribute their own 
mechanisms of selection and exclusion to define class and class fractions. Hence, 
advantages and disadvantages. These include sex, ethnic origin, place of residence, age, 
and marital status. Bourdieu points out, in this connection, that behind the requirement of a 
diploma may lie some discrimination on those grounds.  
Despite designating as representative of the least advantaged social group in late twentieth 
century France a ‘poorly-educated black single mother’, Bourdieu fails to explore the 
relevance of secondary characteristics or ascription in terms of their giving rise to rents of a 
different nature from those deriving from the possession of capitals. Arguably, while the 
absence of capitals is not impossible to overcome, ascription can be. Ascriptive traits, such 
as sex, age, ethnicity, and place of birth, are not a question of having a greater or small 
quantity of capitals, and the traction these provide in various fields of social action. They are 
a question of people being identified, for example in the labor market, by characteristics 
considered intrinsically negative in relation to longstanding social norms or practices, and 
therefore as lowering a person’s value, no matter what his or her other productive attributes 
might be. Perhaps the notion of negative rents makes sense in this context, adding a further 
dimension of differentiation to our understanding of categorical inequalities (à la Tilly) in the 
labor market. 
 
37 More generally, culture occupies an important place in Bourdieu’s sociology, as remarked by Savage et al., 
not only representing an autonomous sphere of social life, as in his analysis of taste, but also providing a crucial 
gateway to grasping the social positions, aspirations, and strategies of groups within the social structure. 
III Working paper 50                                             Celia Lessa Kerstenetzky 
 
27 
 
 
Bourdieu’s Distinction is full of ideas (as well as exhaustive illustrations thereof) that might 
help provide a sociological basis for rents in the sense of advantages attached to relative 
scarcity. Although it borders on the insane to follow them all through to their conclusion, one 
additional idea is worth a brief mention. It is Bourdieu’s suggestion of determinants of taste 
as a way of understanding the formation of consumer preferences and the role this reasoning 
plays in an overall approach to rents. This point connects our discussion here with the initial 
remarks by Caroline Foley, in Section 2, about the part the demand side of the market plays 
in the emergence of rents. Bourdieu’s idea is that there is an evident parallel between, on the 
one hand, the search for distinction and the associated class struggles underlying the 
systems of production of goods and distribution of advantages, and, on the other, what 
happens in the system of consumption. Consumption behavior and consumption demand, 
whether they relate to food, drink, clothing, accommodation, or entertainment, are mediated 
by class habitus and are subject to the same laws of distinction and class differentiation as 
the features underlying the other systems. Such a conception is, indeed, integral to the 
explanation of modern hierarchies. This notwithstanding, Bourdieu complains, the 
investigation of the economic and social determinants of tastes is practically non-existent in 
economics. To be sure, Thorstein Veblen ([1899]2009) had already examined this possibility 
through his ‘conspicuous consumption’ category back in the nineteenth century; but Bourdieu 
is right in asserting that, perhaps with the exception of those few economists who have 
engaged in research on endogenous preferences, if this exists at all is a peripheral theme in 
economics.38  
*** 
As a summary of the sociological contribution, we see that, while neoclassical definitions of 
rents appear in some authors and not in others, its more noticeable feature is the focus on 
the social structure as the ultimate source of myriad rents, no matter the market structure. 
Disputes between diverse groups - including between capital and labor, fractions of capital, 
and groups of workers - shape inequalities. The disputes in turn are backed by wealth 
positions, and, conversely, contribute to reinforcing them. We also see that, as in classical 
economics, class- and class fraction- struggles occupy center stage, but group differentiation, 
as well as the valuable resources some groups happen to possess, encompasses a broader 
spectrum. 
 
5. Discussion: an outline of a rents-based theory of inequality 
In this final section, I briefly highlight the main takeaways from my journey in search of 
conceptual and theoretical clarification on economic rents and their relationship with 
contemporary inequalities. These include a cogent case for economic rents as a unifying 
 
38 John Kenneth Galbraith’s discussion of advertising is another attempt, but the endogeneity which he points 
to refers to firms manipulating consumers’ preferences. Although Bourdieu would not deny that this happens, 
he would probably take it as secondary to the more primary sociological forces of distinction in play in egalitarian, 
merit-based societies, i.e. societies in which upfront discrimination on any grounds is ruled out. 
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language drawn from the series of arguments we have considered and an outline of a rents-
based approach to inequality. Let me start with a condensation of all the contributions. 
To begin with, prima facie, economic rents are payments which emerge from the interaction 
between demand for and short supply of some valuable resource. In the economics 
approach, this interaction may feature market power which, depending on the theoretical 
perspective adopted, may or may not last (e.g. Tullock, Stiglitz, Mazzucato versus Alchian), 
and which may or may not reflect some deeper distributive conflict over the economic surplus 
(e.g. classical economics, Mazzucato versus neoclassical economics), which, in turn, may or 
may not be related to core traits of the economic system (e.g. classical versus neoclassical 
economics). Ownership of the valuable resource in itself, i.e. that beneath short supply may 
lie class-monopolies of access to wealth even in the absence of ostensible market power, as 
much as the forces shaping demand and therefore competition for the use of the valuable 
resource, is a problem that persists. The sociological approach jumps in at this point by 
offering an account of the underlying social structure and processes of social structuration 
(the Bourdieu hypothesis of ‘distinction’) that assist the social closures supporting rents. In 
the process, this approach enlarges the domain of rents to include rents of labor, taking into 
consideration the differential possession of both capitals in a broad sense and ascriptive 
characteristics among groups of workers. These capitals and characteristics in turn are 
argued to be responsible for positive – as well as negative, I would add – rents. The 
sociological approach also brings in related ideas of sociological drivers of consumption 
demand and their implications for distribution. So, after the sociological import, especially 
under the Tilly-Bourdieu version, we may carve out a concept of economic rents as pecuniary 
advantages deriving from the exclusive ownership of valued resources by people occupying 
particular social positions (class or class fractions) as these resources came to be socially 
recognized as valued. 
At this point, we need to understand how best to use this sociological input. I suggest two 
possible ways: division of intellectual labor between disciplines; and crossdisciplinarity.39 
Under the former, we accommodate the sociological discussion as supplementary to the 
economic discussion; under the latter, we see it as embedding the economic analysis of 
distribution. So, when it comes to distribution, economic analysis starts from the premise that 
initial endowments, the remote origins of rents, are given. Thus, initial wealth distribution, the 
distributional original sin, is black-boxed. In its function as supplementary discussion, the 
sociological approach will then provide an analytical account of the ownership-of-valuable-
resources constraint under which market economies operate, by focusing on the background 
social structure. In providing embeddedness, however, the sociological investigation will 
follow the long shadow continuously cast on distribution by initial endowments. It will help 
clarify not only structural aspects of inequality and the duration of these, but also ongoing 
mechanisms for grabbing privileged positions and the forces that perpetuate groups’ relative 
scarcities, thus giving rise to myriad rents as these surface in current market relations. 
 
39 According to Cat (2017), ‘[c]rossdisciplinary work involves borrowing resources from one discipline to serve 
the aims of a project in another.’ 
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The embeddedness solution needs some elaboration. It may be defined, analogously with 
the use of the embeddedness category by Karl Polanyi in The Great Transformation, as the 
idea that, in the same way as market forces are inextricably immersed in social relations, the 
economic explanation of contemporary inequalities, if it is to be illuminating, cannot stop at 
the threshold of market transactions but needs to go further and uncover the sociology behind 
them. The disembedding of that explanation from its broader, non-economic, social ecology 
has left the economic narrative unprepared to making sense of contemporary inequalities 
where rents abound. And in addition to recruiting sociology to perform a supplementary 
function – whereby issues of social structure, social position, ownership and property rights 
underlying the distribution of wealth which precedes market transactions are brought to the 
forefront - the idea is to tap into sociological hypotheses to shed light on the stickiness of 
these conditions, the mechanisms of their continuation and reproduction, and the ways 
through which they are both formed by the social structure and replicate it. Under this light, 
the relationship between wealth inequality and income inequality appears as mediated by 
mechanisms of exploitation and/or opportunity hoarding. Moreover, lived experiences of 
inequalities and the mechanisms of their reproduction join forces to shape personal 
capacities and propensities, which then feed back into inequalities. Wealth, in turn, is 
envisaged as a range of different forms of capital, from economic to political (a theme 
cherished by the rent-seeking literature) to social (closed networks, nepotism, social practices 
and norms) to educational (the educational premiums of highly stratified higher education) 
and, beyond these, to softer or internalized versions of capital, such as capacities and 
propensities shaped by upbringing (cultural capital) and social experience. Again, under this 
light, ‘income’ appears as related to ‘rent’ in a very intimate way, much more so than genus 
is related to species (i.e. as in the classical economics classification of rent as only a form of 
income). The ultimate implication is that within any remuneration or income lies not so much 
individual effort or sacrifice as a proprietary structure of capitals. A theory of inequality for our 
times needs to reveal this structure to its full extent, including the role played by ascription. 
Much more, also, could and should be said about the consumption demand side, from a 
rents-based perspective. Why are certain things or attributes more desired and valued than 
others - thus making them look like wealth and entitling their possessors to claim rents? 
It should be clear at this point that if the embeddedness route is pursued to its conclusion, a 
paradigm shift ensues. As stated, the sociological approach to rents suggests that these are 
widespread in contemporary societies. Beyond the mere replacement rate of an economic 
input, every form of pecuniary remuneration would thus be rent.40 Having greater or lesser 
remuneration would reflect causes beyond mere individual economic contribution: this 
variation would reflect the varying degrees of possession (often connected with social origin) 
of valued resources or wealth in quite a broad sense – a hypothesis that cuts across the usual 
way of thinking about one’s remuneration and the scale of remuneration in capitalist societies. 
But while what people take for themselves as remuneration is illuminated by the background 
 
40 In a way, Marx would be vindicated. For him, all surplus was converted into rents that flowed to wealth-
owners. And to postulate, as he did, that the latter consisted exclusively of the capitalist and landed classes, 
and that wealth equated with capital in the strictly economic sense, was not unrealistic back in the nineteenth 
century. 
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resources they happen to possess, how are we to make sense of, say, the foreground 
sources of these earnings?  
One starting point is suggested by Herbert Simon’s quip that we (the average we) in rich 
societies only really earn around one tenth of our pecuniary gains – the rest being our 
appropriation of externalities, past and present, or, as he calls it, the social capital.41 A 
perhaps more radical perspective is to start out with the supposition that market economies 
are gigantic systems of social cooperation in which all value is socially generated (both in the 
sense of being recognized as value and in the quantitative sense of the actual amount of it 
that is created); in particular, individual contributions are hard to sort out or even to make 
sense of, again, individually, to an important extent (e.g., to the extent that people use a 
common language and are socialized within social institutions and belong in social positions). 
This being so, actual appropriations from this social value by individuals or groups are settled 
by conventions, the social contract, power relations (as in asymmetric bargaining) – in short, 
institutionalized forms of protection and closure - rather than by well delimitated specific 
contributions. To be clear, this is not to imply that individuals do not contribute. Of course 
they do, and often very creatively. It is rather that their discrete contribution is indeterminate 
– and that the insistence on pinning it down has left us intellectually disarmed in the face of 
current inequalities. Positive rents, but also negative ones (for example, the income discounts 
that minorities or discriminated-against groups receive in the labour market on account of 
being black or Muslim or Hispanic or migrant or indigenous or slum dwellers or mothers or 
potential mothers), as well as regressive and compensatory ones, are negotiated over the 
social surplus – and the possession of various forms of capital, by volume as well as by 
composition, is to an important extent what backs up the relative powers of the different 
groups in those negotiations.  
The executive compensations of our time illustrate the point neatly, as they seem to result 
from a combination of social norms (a ‘these-highly-talented-people’ norm), the unfettered 
accumulation of various forms of capital – social (e.g. cross-boards-of-directors participation, 
nepotism), cultural, and political – and the institutional might (e.g. no institutional limits set for 
these payments) that they provide. Yet another illustration is given by the disjunction between 
the incomes of top professional earners in the US, and their supposedly higher talents or 
skills, and the symmetric conjunction of these incomes with this group’s ability to raise barriers 
and hoard opportunities.42 But, more generally, a glance at the range of possible connections 
between the social surplus and individual appropriations of it, and thus at the roles played by 
mediating conventions, a social contract, and power, is provided by the variety of inequality 
rates subsisting in otherwise similarly advanced capitalist economies. The high variation of 
post-fisc inequality rates stands out – implying socially acceptable ways of correcting market 
 
41 ‘How large are these externalities, which must be regarded as owned jointly by members of the whole society? 
When we compare the poorest with the richest nations, it is hard to conclude that social capital can produce 
less than about 90 percent of income in wealthy societies like those of the United States or Northwestern 
Europe.’ Simon (2000). 
42 Rothwell (2019) reports the delinking of the distribution of skills from the distribution of income in the US. I 
thank Robert Wade for sending me the reference to this article. 
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appropriations via tax-and-transfer institutions. But beyond that, the huge variation in 
premiums handed out for higher education among these advanced economies (e.g. 67% in 
the US, 20% in Norway, in 2013), and therefore of wage inequalities, speaks of the diversity 
of social contracts with respect to the provision, public or private, and the social value, of 
education.43 More could be said, by way of illustration, of labor market institutions, tax 
legislation, and other such mediating institutions - many of which have already been 
mentioned in this paper.  
One last point should be made, if only as an afterthought, and that is the question of how to 
normatively frame rents and the policy consequences of entertaining the broad move I 
suggest here. In fact, if rents are as widespread as the picture which surfaces here implies, 
and are ingrained in contemporary inequalities to the point where we question widespread 
meritocratic presuppositions (Bourdieu even calls diplomas the modern version of the ancient 
titles of nobility), what normative horizons can we think of? In mainstream economics, perfect 
competition is the normative benchmark: the belief that free competition guarantees that 
pecuniary compensation will correspond to contribution (and justifies the remaining 
inequalities), and will thus magically suppress rents if and where they appear. In the 
heterodox tradition, rents that are inimical to the workings of the production system should 
be restricted precisely for jeopardizing the development of productive forces and economic 
growth, although a state-shaped productive side could eventually do better (Mazzucato 
2018). What entertaining a sociological approach seems to suggest instead, thanks to its 
focus on the interaction between wealth ownership, social structures, and remuneration, is a 
general benchmark for social justice that would promote a more even spread of wealth under 
its many guises, thereby guaranteeing an appropriate level of social mobility. If society’s 
riches are a collective endeavour, and appropriation thereof is mediated by societal rules, 
including the assertion and protection of property rights, fairness would seem to require more 
upfront circulation of property,44 in addition to labour market re-regulation, and more social 
investment and social security (which would expand the realm of social public goods). 
Incidentally, the Bourdieuan adage ‘change so as to conserve’ misses the potential for 
redressing structural inequalities of social investment policies such as childcare and lifelong-
learning interventions. To an important extent, what people take to the market (say, what they 
own), what they get from the market (say, rents), and what they can reasonably expect the 
market to provide them with (consumption goods, services) are all affected by (in)action on 
the part of the welfare state. Therefore, again, the welfare state, if it aims to address current 
inequalities, cannot help promoting the circulation of property (e.g. via tax legislation and 
social inheritance), the re-regulation of labour markets, and the expansion of public 
consumption. While it already promotes the latter to a significant extent, a rents-based 
 
43 For a discussion see Weisstanner and Armingeon (2018).  Incidentally, this conventionalist-political approach 
to value contrasts with the essentialist search for a common benchmark, be it labour or utility, which underlies 
the value theories of economics. 
44 This proposal occupies a central place in Anthony Atkinson (2015) and Thomas Piketty (2019) reform 
blueprints, following a long tradition going back to 18th century Agrarian Justice, by Thomas Paine. The 
christening of is as ‘circulation of property’ is due to Piketty (2019). 
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approach to inequality might provide new conceptual and normative bases for the 
continuation of such policies as well as for braving new worlds of action.  
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